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INSECURITY?

When It Comes To Workplace Surveillance Of Electronic Communications,
Employers Are Free To Establish The Rules Of The Game
by Philip L. Gordon, Esq.
Introduction
In May, 2001, when federal judges on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit learned that,
in at least one important respect, they were no different
from millions of clock-punchers worldwide, they were
outraged.' What was the startling revelation for these
usually imperturbable appellate court judges? Mere
bureaucrats in the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, a little known group of civil servants who
administer the federal court system, were monitoring the
federal judiciary's e-mail and Internet traffic, including the
traffic of these Article III judges. 2 'he perceived intrusion
upon the seclusion of judicial chambers so incensed
Judge Alex Kozinski that he took the highly unusual step
of publicly denouncing the chief of the administrative
agency in the Wall StreetJournaland discussed his views
on a nationally televised talk show. 3
Ironically, in the years preceding this millennial
epiphany, judges, practically all of whom came of age
with the rotary dial telephone, had put in place a regime
which has made it extremely difficult for workers to
recover damages based upon their employers' review of
e-mail and Internet communications. This situation has
resulted from a judicial construction of the Federal
Wiretap Act, 4 which effectively eliminates any statutory
privacy protection for workplace e-mail and Internet use.
With e-mail and Internet use steadily transforming the
United States Postal Service into a quaint relic, the time is
ripe for judges, and Congress as well, to re-think the law
governing the privacy of e-mail and Internet
communications. However, the events of September 11,
2001, have placed the issue of workplace privacy on the
judicial and legislative backburner.

Consequently, employers, who are increasingly
concerned about regulating the use of e-mail and Internet
in the workplace, should view this regulatory vacuum as
an opportunity to establish their own rules governing the
use of these resources. 5 Moreover, employers have a
range of electronic monitoring policies from which to
choose. At one end of the spectrum is a policy aimed at
protecting employers from abuse of their electronic
communications systems through employee consent to
unrestricted electronic monitoring. At the other extreme
is a policy based upon the principle that electronic
privacy should be a workplace benefit. Employers can
tailor either policy to meet their own specific needs and
6
the demands of their particular workforce.

From The Rotary-Dial Telephone To The Apple
Macintosh: The Evolution Of The Federal
Wiretap Act
The 1960s were watershed years for wiretaps. By
that time, tapping technology had been in use for
decades with practically no restrictions or judicial
oversight under federal law. 7 Then, the United States
Supreme Court revolutionized the notion of
comiunications privacy. In Katz v. United States,8 the
Court held that even someone who uses a public
telephone booth can have an objectively reasonable,
subjective expectation of privacy in the content of his
telephone call, an interest protected by the Fourth
9
Amendment from government intrusion.
Congress responded to Katzby outlawing virtually
all interceptions of telephone calls without judicial
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authorization. Congress also strictly limited the
circumstances in which a court could order a telephone
wiretap. 10 However, the statute embodying this regime,
the Federal Wiretap Act, was a creature of its time. The
statute was premised upon a monolithic communications
world inhabited only by AT&T and its copper telephone
lines.
In the opening years of the 1980s, the world upon
which the Federal Wiretap Act was premised changed
slowly, but radically. Apple Computers began to market
"The Macintosh," the first computer designed for
consumption by the general public. Electronic mail was
becoming a widespread means of communication. The
cordless telephone represented the cutting edge of
telephone technology. The answering machine had just
recently become a "must-have" commodity. The
divestiture of AT&T was a work in progress.
With this backdrop, Congress amended the Federal
Wiretap Act in 1986, thereby extending the Act's coverage
to "electronic communications, " 1 In contrast to "wire
communications" - transmissions of the human voice over
telephone lines - "electronic communications"
encompassed transfers of data not containing the human
12
voice (Napster, of course, was not yet on the radar).
At the same time, Congress passed an
accompaniment to the Federal Wiretap Act, which
sometimes is referred to as the Stored Communications
Act. 13 This statute protects stored electronic
communications in two limited respects. First, an antihacking provision prohibits unauthorized access to "a
facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided," such as a server, for purposes of
obtaining access to electronic communications stored in
that facility. 14 Second, the statute imposes upon those
who provide electronic communications services to the
public, such as an Internet Service Provider ("ISP"), an
obligation to maintain the privacy of electronic
communications stored on their own servers.15

The Judicial De-Clawing Of Federal Statutory
Protections For The Privacy Of E-Mail And Internet
Communications
The practical effects of this dichotomy between
electronic communications and stored electronic
communications became apparent only as claims under
the Federal Wiretap Act based upon the unauthorized
review of e-mail began to trickle through the judicial
pipeline. The seminal case in the area, SteveJackson
16
Games, Inc. v.UnitedStates Secret SermS,
did not involve
workplace monitoring, bt rather the Secret Service's
review of un-retrieved e-mail stored on the hard drive of
a computer seized from a company offering an electronic
bulletin board service.1 7 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Secret Service's
conduct was not actionable under the Federal Wiretap
Act because the Act prohibits only "real-time"
interceptions of electronic communications, i.e., the
acquisition of the content of the communication while the
communication is in transmission,18 Because the e-mail
reviewed by the Secret Service was in electronic storage,
the Federal Wiretap Act did not apply. However, the
Secret Service did not escape Stee, Jackson Games scotfree. The Fifth Circuit's opinion notes that the Secret
Service did not challenge the district court's finding that
its agents had violated the Stored Communications Act by
reviewing the un-retrieved e-mail without authorization
from the service provider, without the consent of either
party to the communications reviewed, and without
19
judicial authorization.
Steve Jackson Games opened the door to unrestrained
monitoring of workplace e-mail and Internet use. Until
relatively recently, software capable of "real-time"
interception of e-mail and Internet communications was
not even commercially available. Consequently,
employers seeking to monitor employee e-mail and
Internet use had no choice but to retrieve th content of
those communications from electronic storage on the

"The statute was premised upon a
monolithic communications world

employer's server. Moreover, unlike
the Secret Service in St(eiJa-cksono
Games, an employer can not be held
liable under the Stored
Communications Act for retrieving
employee e-mail from its own server
because that statute expressly
excludes the system provider from
liability. 20 The Stored
Communications Act also is
inapplicable to an employer's
retrieval of e-mail permanently
stored on an employee's hard drive
because the Stored Communications
Act protects electronic
communicitions only when in
intermediate or temporary storage. 2'
The Fifth Circuit's construction of
the Federal Wiretap Act to prohibit
only' real-time" interception of email and Internet use dominated the
judicial scene until the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
addressed the issue inJanuao
20I .22 Perhaps as a precursor to its
outcry against e-mail and Internet
monitoring by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, the
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Ninth Circuit in Konop v. Hawaiian
Aiines23 held that the acquisition of
the content of an electronic
communication may be actionable
under the Fecdral Wiretap Act even if
the electronic communiciation is not
in transmission when the acquisition
24
occurs.
In that case, Konop, an
airline pilot, maintained a closed
bulletin board for pilots to speak
critically about both union
representatives and company
officials. 25 Konop alleged that an
airline executive violated the Federal
Wiretap Act by using false pretenses
to obtain access to, and to review,
26
messages on the aulletin board
The Ninth Circuit, rejecting the Fifth
Circuit's construction of the Act in
SieveJackson Games, held that the
airline executive's actions constituted
27
an interception under the Act.
Relying in part upon its holding in
UiledStates v. Smitb,' 8 that the
unauthorized retrieval of a voice mail
message constituted an interception
under the Federal Wiretap Act, 29 the
Konop court stated that there was no
reasoned basis for distinguishing
between voice mail and electronic
mail.30
The proponents of workplace
privacy had a short-lived victoiy. In a
startling reversal, revealed shortly
before the September 11 terrorist
attacks, the panel in Konop withdrew
its opinion suasponte, with one
judge dissenting. 3i The majority's
brief opinion provides no reason for
this highly unusual action.3 The
majority might have belatedly
realized the potential impact of the
panel's original decision on law
enforcement, thus explaining the
panel's hasty retreat from its novel
holding. If the retrieval of stored email does constitute an interception
under the Federal Wiretap Act, then
law enforcement authorities must
obtain court authorization and
comply with the Federal Wiretap
Act's stringent limitations on
interceptions before, for example,
obtaining access to e-mail on an ISP's
servers. By contrast, the Stored

Communications Act, which
otherwise regulates access by law
enforcement officials to electronic
communications in storage at an ISP,
establishes a much lower threshold
and much less stringent requirements
for access to stored electronic
communications.33

Congressional
Reconstruction Of Federal
Privacy Protections For EMail And Internet Use Is Not
On The Horizon
The prevailing statutory
construction leads to bizarre results
in the employment context.
Communications by telephone whether wire-line, cordless, or
cellular - enjoy full protection
34
under the Federal Wiretap Act.
Federal law also protects the most
obvious piece of junk, snail mail,
from unauthorized interception.3 5 By
contrast, under Steejackson Games
and its progeny, electronic mail
enjoys no protection under the Act
36
unless intercepted in real-time. Put
another way, employers cannot
obtain the contents of telephone
communications in any form without
risking liability under the Act, but
employers can review employee email and Internet use with impunity
so long as they do not intercept the
content of the communication in
real-tine,37
This is not the first time that the
Federal Wiretap Act has resulted in
an arguably irrational stratification of
means of communication. In 1986,
when Congress expanded the
Federal Wiretap Act to encompass
"electronic communications,"
Congress contemporaneously and
expressly excluded cordless
telephone communications from the
Act's coverage. 38 Congress reasoned
that the general public could readily
attain the radio portion of a cordless
telephone conversation that resulted
from the transmission between the
handset and the base unit.
Consequently, the cordless
telephone user could not have an
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objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in his cordless telephone
3
conversations. 9
This "cordless" exclusion, like
the real-time construction of the
word "interception," resulted in a
boon for law enforcement.
Numerous reported cases decided
under the Federal Wiretap Act after
1986 analyzed motions filed by
criminal defendants to suppress the
contents of cordless telephone
conversations acquired by a police
scanner, or even a neighbor's baby
monitor. 40 Relying on the
Congressional exclusion, courts
uniformly denied these motions to
suppress, whether based upon the
Act or upon the Fourth
41
Amendment.
Notwithstanding this law
enforcement benefit, Congress
eliminated the "cordless exclusion" in
1994.42 Congress concluded that the
distinction between unprotected calls
over cordless telephones and
protected calls over cellular and
wire-line telephones had become
untenable. Even though it was
commonly known that others could
easily acquire the radio portion of a
cordless telephone call, the use had
become so widespread that society
could no longer tolerate unrestrained
interceptions of this means of
43
communication.
A similar congressional reversal
of the distinction between wire
communications and electronic
communications resulting from the
judicial construction of the term
"interception" is not on the horizon.
In the wake of September 1lth,
Congress probably will not amend
the Federal Wiretap Act to put the
interception of stored electronic mail
on an equal footing with the
interception of telephone calls. To
do so would impose new constraints
on law enforcement when society is
focused on the war on terrorism and
the need to ensure personal security.
If anything, Congress signaled its
approval of the judicial distinction
between real-time interception and
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retrieval from storage when it passed
anti-terrorism legislation in October
2001, popularly known as the USA
Patriot Act. That statute, among
other things, removed voice mail
from the scope of the Federal
Wiretap Act. 44 As a result, telephone
calls, like electronic mail, now enjoy
federal statutory protection only
when intercepted in real-time,

How Employers Can Fill The
Judicial And Legislative
Vacuum
Until Congress takes action, the
e-mailer s situation today will remain
similar to the man in the sidewalk
telephone booth in Katz, or the
cordless telephone user between
1986 and 1994. The means of
communication has become a part of
everyday life but its use is potentially
perilous.
From the employer's
perspective, this situation has
advantages in the workplace. The email system can pose a potential
threat by, for example, allowing the
transmission of trade secrets off site
with the press of a button. In
addition, Internet use can interfere
with the intended business purposes
of the employer's system resources
through, for example, the
downloading of pornography. Also,
the circulation by e-mail of
provocative messages could raise the
specter of discrimination or sexual
harassment claims. Given these
risks, employers are appropriately
concerned about these abuses and
their potential costs. In the absence
of judicial or legislative limits,
employers have the freedom to
protect themselves from these risks
as long as they do not intercept the
content of electronic
communications in real time without
first obtaining their employees'
45
consent.
By the same token, unrestricted
electronic monitoring may stifle
beneficial uses of e-mail and the
Internet. Privacy spawns creativity,
and the rapid interchange of ideas

through e-mail can accelerate the
creative process. But, if an employee
fears that a supervisor who monitors
the mail will swat down an
unorthodox idea, she might be less
willing to express herself. With
respect to personal activities, a
modicum of privacy may ultimately
benefit the employer. After all, which
course of conduct is more efficient:
fifteen minutes of surfing
Amazon.com's Web site or one hour
on a secret mission to Barnes &
Noble located several blocks from
the office?
This question remains: how
should an employer regulate the use
of e-mail and the Internet in the
workplace? The answer will depend
upon an array of factors including,
for example, the employer's own
objectives, the maturity and
sophistication of the employer's
workforce, the function of e-mail and
Internet communications in the
particular workplace, and whether
trade secrets are accessible in
electronic format.
Those employers who view their
electronic communications system as
a threat could deter abusive conduct
with a policy designed to send a clear
signal to employees that if they abuse
the employer's system, they will be
caught and disciplined. Some of the
principal points of this type of policy
would state the following:
1. The electronic communications
system and all communications sent,
received, or stored by the system are
the property of the employer;
2. The employer reserves the right to
monitor, read, copy, print, and
distribute the content of all electronic
communications, including e-mail
and Web sites visits, sent, received, or
stored by the system;
3. How the monitoring will be
effectuated;
4. By signing the employer's
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monitoring policy, the employee
consents to the employer's
monitoring of the content of all
electronic communications sent,
received, or stored by the system;
5. When using the electronic
communications system, employees
should always keep in mind that
others may view their
communications, therefore
employees should use discretion
when sending e-mail and making
Web visits;
6. Employees are not authorized to
use any computer password unless
the password is revealed to the
employer;
7. Personal use of the employer's
electronic communications system is
not permitted;
8. The following are impermissible
uses of the system: transmission of
sexually oriented or ethnically
derogatory materials, unauthorized
distribution of trade secrets or
confidential information, and
unauthorized copying of copyrighted
material;
9. Any violation of the policy may
subject the employee to discipline,
up through and including
termination;
A different electronic monitoring
policy should be put in place by
employers with less concern about
potential abuse and a philosophy
that their corporate mission will
benefit from a workforce who can
communicate freely by e-mail or over
the Internet. This type of policy
would guarantee the privacy of
certain communications while
preserving the employer's ability to
police the system and to punish
abusers. A policy embodying this
approach might include the
following elements:

1. The types of personal uses that are
permissible and impermissible;
2. The amount of personal time
allowed;
3. The time of day that personal use
is permitted;
4. That permissible, personal e-mail
and Internet use will not be
monitored absent justification for
doing so;
5. The security measures that will be
taken to protect the privacy of
personal e-mail and Internet use;
6. An explanation of the type of
monitoring technology used to
prevent impermissible personal use;
7. How frequently employees will be
monitored;
8. The consequences of violating the
policy.
There is one caveat for an employer
who opts for this "privacy-as-abenefit" approach. A failure to honor
the policy might open the employer
to liability for tortiously intruding
upon the private space created by the
employer or for breach of an implied
contract.
Regardless of the type of policy
the employer decides to adopt, a
document retention/destruction
policy should accompany any
electronic monitoring policy. The
former policy should be designed to
assist the employer in managing the
enormous quantity of information
stored in its computer systems. At the
same time, this policy should reduce
the cost of responding to "electronic
discovery" and reduce the risk that a
"smoking-gun" e-mail will remain
stored on the employer's system. The
policy should address the following:
1. Classifications of data compatible
with search capabilities;
2. Segregation of privileged

communications and trade secrets;
3. The period for data retention,
bearing in mind the type of data in
question and any applicable legal
requirements;
4. Strict limits on the retention of
personal e-mail;
5. Application of the policy to all
corporate computers (e.g., local,
network, and back-up storage) and
to computers of employees leaving
the company.
Document destruction, no matter
how well intentioned, almost
inevitably will spur allegations of bad
faith when litigation does arise. To
deter such allegations, the policy
should be developed and
implemented long before litigation is
on the horizon, In addition, the
employer should maintain all
documents bearing upon the creation
and implementation of the policy.
Finally, the policy should be
consistently enforced, and
suspended and reviewed when
litigation is imminent.

Conclusion
The American workforce
continues to use a growing array of
communications tools to the benefit
of employers. Some of these tools,
like e-mail and the Irternet,
contemporaneously create
unprecedented risks for employers,
The existing statutory regime and
accompanying judicial construction
impose few limits on workplace
surveillance of e-mail and Internet
use. Nonetheless, employers should
avoid the temptation of spying on
their employees without notice.
Surreptitious monitoring has no
deterrent value and breeds
resentment and discomfort upon
discovery. Instead, each employer
should give notice to its workforce of
the method and scope of electronic
monitoring by promulgating a policy
tailored for the employer's particular
workplace.
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